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I
HE LEGAL INSTITUTION known as "the corporation" has served as
an avenue for fundamental changes in the system of ownership
and economic organization familiarly known as "the private
property system." By making possible the aggregation of many owner-
ships, it has constrained the erection of a system placing management in
the hands of a non-ownership group, though still nominally representative
of the owners. The exigency of technical development has favored vastly
increased size and scope of the corporate enterprise. This has been power-
fully aided by the system of distribution dependent on national markets.
Great size in many crucial fields thus becomes advantageous.1
Subsequent to 1920, large corporations have found it possible to gener-
ate their own capital by withholding part of their earnings from distribu-
tion to their shareholders.2 They were thus freed from the necessity of
gathering capital from the savings of a great number of private individu-
als. This still further removed corporations which had achieved size from
dependence on the system of individual capital accumulation, individual
choice of investment, and individual assumption of risk.
The aggregation of individual savings for investment purposes has like-
wise taken place. The most important single avenue by which this has oc-
curred has been the growth of the great insurance companies, more espe-
cially life insurance companies. By combining the feature of insurance
* Professor of Law, Columbia University.
1 Stocking and Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise 53-84 (1951).
2 This fs characteristic of industrial corporations, though it is not true of public utilities
and railroads. General Electric Co., General Motors Co., United States Steel Corp., and the
chief members of the Standard Oil group, for example, have not been significantly in the capital
markets for thirty years.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
with their ability to handle savings, private individuals have felt more
secure, by entrusting their savings to these companies. As of the present,
the function of applying individual savings to investment and capital ap-
preciation has increasingly come into the hands of a relatively few large
insurance companies, and the tendency is increasing.3
Aside from financial corporations, the number of essential industries
controlled by concentrates is great, though measurement is a matter for
economists rather than for lawyers. The situation in any case is well rec-
ognized. The most recent study4 carries forward a study made by Profes-
sor Clair Wilcox.' Of interest is Professor Wilcox's classification of indus-
try into 135 different trades. A "concentration ratio" is worked out.
Fifty-seven per cent of the value of all manufactured products was ac-
counted for by industries in, which the four largest producers or less
turned out half the total value. Concentration was highest, on the whole,
in the most essential industries.
The existence of concentration and the concentrates is here assumed
rather than argued. There is debate as to whether the trend is toward con-
centration, or away from concentration, or whether concentration is more
or less static. The most recent dispassionate summary of the subject by
Professor M. A. Adelman,6 of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
reviews the material, concluding that the evidence is not determinative
either way, but submits as a demonstrable fact that the largest 139 manu-
facturing corporations held 49.6% of the assets of all manufacturing cor-
porations in 1931, and held 45% of such assets in 1947-a slight reduction
in percentage, though, of course, a huge increase in actual volume.7 In a
country the size of the United States that degree of concentration would
. 3 According to the Institute of Life Insurance, Life Insurance News (Dec. 28, 1950), there
were 83,000,000 life insurance policy holders in the United States. Even allowing liberally for
duplication, roughly half of the entire population, and far more than half of its income-
receivers, use the life insurance companies as a vehicle for savings and investment. Total
assets were over $63,000,000,000 at the end of 1950. Though there are 609 life insurance
companies, approximately 70% of these assets are in the hands of the ten largest companies
(Shanks, Statement before Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of House of Repre-
sentatives Committee on Judiciary, Nov. 30,1949, reprinted by Prudential Life Insurance Co.,
1950). For a recent press summary, see N.Y. Times, § 3, p. 39, col. 6 (Dec. 17, 1951); for their
participation in the Voluntary Credit Restraint Committee, see N.Y. Times, § 2, p. 50, col. 5
(Dec. 20, 1951).
4 For a recent economic study on the subject, see Stocking and Watkins, Monopoly and
Free Enterprise (1951).
5 Wilcox, Competition and Monopoly in American Industry (TNEC Monograph No. 21,
1940).
6 The Measurement of Industrial Concentration, 33 Rev. of Econ. and Stat. 269 (1951).
7 Ibid., at 276.
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be sufficient to pose legal, governmental and social problems so long as it
continued.
Further, concentration is by no means wholly an affair of the 139
"largest" corporations. Key industries of crucial importance are frequent-
ly concentrated, even though in themselves they are relatively small in
terms of asset values; and through this concentration they exert a degree
of control disproportionate to their size. Much of so-called "small busi-
ness," reckoned in assets, is actually controlled by a concentrate. Thou-
sands of gasoline stations, motor car dealers, and so forth, are nomi-
nally individual enterprises, but their major policies are necessarily dic-
tated by the companies whose products they sell.' On any theory, the
phenomenon of concentration is so great that its juristic effects cannot be
disregarded.
We may take as a base the unchallenged minimum of facts, leaving the
economists to measure the trends. It is here submitted that a juristic
pattern of dealing with concentrates is emerging. The purpose of this
paper is to examine this pattern.
II
Upon the evidence, the following propositions seem warranted:
(1) An immensely important area of American industrial and financial
economy is administered in each field by "concentrates," composed of not
more than five or six large corporations in each identifiable field. (The
word "concentrate" is here used in preference to the newly-coined word
"oligopoly.")
(2) In essential fields, that is, where the community has come to rely
on the concentrate as a source of supply of a commodity or service deemed
necessary or powerfully desired by the community, certain minimum and
more or less uniform requirements are imposed by the community upon
the concentrate.
(3) These requirements fall into two categories:
(a) requirements insisted on by the community as a whole. First
among these is the requirement that there shall be an adequate supply of
the commodity or service, made available at a price "acceptable" to the
community. Other requirements are beginning to emerge including,
among others, the maintenance of employment, reasonably continued
technical advance, creation of a viable system of supply and distribution
in times of emergency such as war, or acute need for national defense.
s In 1940, Professor Clair Wilcox estimated that 57% of the value of all manufactured
products was accounted for by industries in which the four largest producers, when there were
that many, turned out half or more of the total value. Wilcox, op. cit. supra note 5, at 234.
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(b) requirements addressed to protection of individuals dealing with the
concentrate or any part of it. First among these is the emerging require-
ment that the commodity or the service shall be rendered to individuals
without discrimination. A second group of requirements relates to protec-
tion of labor, which finds specialized expression in labor law and corre-
sponding administration.
These requirements appear, expand and develop as the American econo-
my develops, and as community consciousness of its needs and of the
needs of masses of individuals emerges and crystallizes; or as the impact of
war or emergency causes the community to deal with a given situation.
Such dealing is commonly accomplished politically, with the intervention,
friendly or hostile, of the national government. The impact of the concen-
trate on the state and the state on the concentrate is thus steadily grow-
ing.
(4) In the American system, the result of such an impact has invariably
been the working out of a rudimentary "plan" defining, with greater or
less precision, the relations between the concentrate and the political
state. These rudimentary plans may remain static for some period of time,
though they are more likely to develop and to expand the area of their
definition and scope as impacts increasingly take place.
(5) This evolution is not a matter of chance. In modern industrialized
society, neither the political state nor the concentrate can avoid the im-
pact, nor can they avoid the ensuing regulation of their relationships.
Choice of action lies between greater or less exactness in detail in defining
relations. The issues to be resolved are the criteria by which the manage-
ment of the concentrate shall be deemed to have performed (or failed to
perform) the requirements imposed by the community.
(6) The results of the arrangements or rudimentary plans emerging
from the successive impacts between concentrates and the community are
embodied in law. This law may take the form of court decisions, notably
decrees in antitrust litigation, legislation, or administrative regulation.
When thus expressed, such law may be called "explicit law."
(7) Existing and foreseeable community requirements, even when ful-
filled by concentrates without impact or resulting legal arrangements,
though they have not resulted in explicit rule of law, are nevertheless
foreseeable, enforcible obligations of the concentrate. They are, in sub-
stance, inchoate rules of law, failure to respect which leads to prompt im-
pact and an arrangement compelling their fulfillment.
(8) The resulting content suggests the gradual evolution of a legal sys-
tem of economic rights and privileges, duties and obligations evolving with
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the evolution of the industrial and financial system of the United States.
This system at present relies upon and expects the acquiescence of the
concentrates in the defined objectives of the American democracy.
The issue is thus not between a "free" or unplanned economy and a
"planned" economy, but between differing views of the objectives for
which planning shall be carried out, the extent and definition of obliga-
tions when these objects have been apprehended, and, endlessly, what
groups shall make these determinations.
This evolution in the American system parallels the evolution of so-
cialist institutions in other parts of the world. Thus, separation of man-
agement from ownership, which is rapidly becoming complete, parallels
the elimination of private ownership in socialist countries and the substi-
tution of politically appointed figures for groups selected by and respon-
sive to private business communities.
The antithesis, accordingly, is no longer between the classic form of
"capitalism" and classic "socialism." It is rather antithesis between meth-
ods, objectives, motivations and directing groups within two different
legal-economic systems having a good deal in common. The chief differ-
ence is the differing emphasis given to individual choice of occupation and
way of life.
III
The foregoing summarizes the essential conclusions reached after exam-
ination of a very great amount of evidence. The corporation, historically,
has been the avenue by which change from the private possessory system
of the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries toward the organiza-
tion system of the twentieth century has taken place in the United
States. This parallels the change in political organization which appears
to be the avenue by which changes took place in Europe. As a result, in
the American case, the great corporation, as monopoly or in a concen-
trate, has become increasingly an arm of the state, held to certain of the
limitations imposed on the state itself by the Bill of Rights requiring the
concentrate to respect certain individual rights and to assure a measure
of equal protection of the laws within the scope of its power, as well as to
fulfill the economic function it has undertaken of production, supply and
service.
It is true that the application of law to this fact situation has been ap-
parently disparate. Some situations have been dealt with by special acts
of Congress, some by decrees rendered in antitrust cases, some by con-
tracts with government agencies, some by a combination of governmental
action of one sort or another, and some by application of rules of Consti-
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tutional law in extraneous litigation. But in all cases the net result has
been to erect a relationship between the political state and the concentrate.
Careful examination supports the statement that, factually, a pattern of
political-economic organization has emerged; that it recurs irrespective of
political parties, and that its root cause is the dependence of the commu-
nity on a concentrate of large corporations dominating essential indus-
tries, and that this necessarily entails the responsibility of these concen-
trates to meet more or less acceptably the community demands.
There is, clearly, no possibility of presenting here more than an outline
of the evidence in support of these hypotheses. What follows therefore is
rather an annotated outline than a full exposition.
It is safe to say concentration in the hands of not more than four great
corporations is the economic structure of over half the volume and certain-
ly of the most essential output of American industry.
The history of developing law of concentrates is almost invariably his-
tory of an impact between a concentrate of great corporations and the
community, leading eventually to an arrangement of some sort governing
the relations of the concentrate with the community through the interven-
tion of the political state. A partial list follows. There has been excluded
from this list the transportation industry because its situation is well
known,9 and also because of its peculiar historical position. Under Ameri-
can law, transportation as a public utility was always both the beneficiary
of, and subject to, regulations because of the peculiar position it had vis-
h-vis the state. Electric light and power is not excluded, not because it is
not also subject to this historical requirement, but because in this indus-
try certain peculiar characteristics appeared transcending the normal
public utility regulation ownership.' 0 What follows is substantially an an-
notated list of an impressive number of specific situations already covered
by specific government-industry plans brought into being by legislation,
court decision, or administrative action, or a combination of these.
1. Commercial Banking. This, of course, stands in a class by itself, owing
to the peculiar relation of commercial banking credit with the national
currency. The various impacts on the community are matter of American
history. Among these may be mentioned the controversy over the second
9 Yet, schematically, the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379
(1887), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1951), was probably the greatest single illustration of the principle here
urged, and probably the first great instance of impact with resulting adjustment. See Sharfman,
The Interstate Commerce Commission (Commonwealth Fund, 1931).
10 The various branches of federal power legislation were distinctly not the normal rate-
regulation measures familiar in state legislation. They were, in terms, acts to organize or
reorganize, in some measure, the structure of the industry.
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Bank of the United States in the Administration of Andrew Jackson;" the
ensuing and unsatisfactory experiments with state banking systems; the
emergence of the national banking system in 1864;12 the repeated banking
and credit crises up to and through 1907;13 at length, the development of
a recognized central planning system beginning with the Federal Reserve
Act of 1914,14 the breakdown of the system in 1933, the revisions of the
Federal Reserve Act in 1933-34-35,1 and minor revisions since that time.
Concentration existed de jure, of course, in Andrew Jackson's time, and
was then dissolved. It existed de facto commencing roughly in 1890 and
continuing substantially through the decade of the 19201S.16 The commer-
cial banking pattern is, however, unique and not likely to be duplicated.
Nevertheless, the final emergence of the Federal Reserve Bank as a cen-
tral planning and steering organization deserves a place in the list.
2. Capital Credit (Investment Banking). Application of capital through
the great life insurance companies and like agencies has reached no similar
arrangement with the state except in emergencies. Yet, as of today, con-
centration of the function of capital application has reached a point sug-
gesting the likelihood of some such adjustment. Presently, a temporary
adjustment exists by arrangement between the Federal Reserve Board
and the National Voluntary Credit Restraint Committee, which in turn
operates through regional committees.17 These counittees, under authori-
ty of the Defense Production Act, are exempted from liability under the
antitrust laws,18 and are permitted and encouraged to lay down rules
guiding the direction of flow of savings into capital loans, the expressed
n1 The literature of this struggle is extensive. See, for example, 5 Channing, History of the
United States 434-66 (1921); Catterall, The Second Bank of the United States (1903); James,
Andrew Jackson, Portrait of a President (1937) (especially cc. 13, 16 and 17); Schlesinger,
The Age of Jackson (1946).
13 Stat. 100 (1864), 12 U.S.C.A. § 11 (1945). See, for a summary of its purposes, Davis v.
Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275 (1896).
13 Elaborated in the record of the so-called Pujo Committee.
14 38 Stat. 251 (1913), 12 U.S.C.A. § 221 (1945); explained in United States v. Davenport,
266 Fed. 425 (W.D. Tex., 1920).
1549 Stat. 704 (1935), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1945) amending the original Federal Reserve Act
of 1913. Mr. Marriner Eccles who formulated the bill stated: "laissez-faire in banking and the
attainment of business stability are incompatible. If variations in the supply of money are to
be compensatory and corrective.., there must be conscious and deliberate control." Mitchell,
Depression Decade 168-71 (1947).
16 Developed by investigation of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, com-
mencing in 1931, for which Ferdinand Pecora was eventually counsel.
17 The record of this committee is not yet available. It operates under supervision of the
Federal Reserve Board which approves its plan of operation.
is 64 Stat. 798 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2071 (1951).
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reason for the operation being to prevent loans which may be considered
as "inflationary," and to steer capital towards industries deemed essential
to the community or needed for the national defense.
This is an emergency situation which may vanish as and when the present
emergency is over. But if and when the state intervention is withdrawn,
the policies of a relatively small number of great companies will remain
to operate as a planning and control apparatus without state intervention.
Should the result fail to meet the needs of the community, it would seem
almost inevitable that some arrangement will be demanded.
3. Steel. Steel is admittedly a concentrate. Prior to 1946 the steel con-
centrate and the community at large had no determinative impact upon
each other, except for the emergency impacts in World War I and World
War II. But at the conclusion of World War II, such an impact did take
place, chiefly because the civilian demand for steel far outran the existing
capacity. The demand anticipated by the steel industry itself (not over 90
million tons) proved a very great under-estimate; 19 the demand actually
proved to be nearer 110 million tons. The ensuing shortage led to a great
controversy in 1947, partly as a result of which the so-called Federal
"Voluntary Allocation Act" 20 was passed. Under it, the industry commit-
tee representing the steel industry undertook to obtain state approval of
allocation plans which, in any case, were being put into effect by the in-
dustry from sheer necessity.2
The experience in steel is brief, but perhaps determinative. A still
greater impact was, of course, caused by the defense emergency presently
prevailing. The allocation plan commenced in time of peace has been re-
sumed and stepped up in time of emergency. Yet the interesting fact is
that even prior to the defense emergency, a combined industry-state
planned operation was demanded-demanded, indeed, quite as much by
the industry as by the community.
4. Aluminum. This was a monopolized industry up to the close of World
War II. Monopoly had occasioned complaint and impact, and the classic
first impact-antitrust action-had been commenced by the Department
of justice. At the close of the war, the United States Government ob-
19 Estimate of Mr. Sykes, President of Inland Steel Co., on behalf of the steel industry,
presented to the Senate Subcommittee on Small Business.
20 61 Stat. 945 (1947), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 1912 (1951). Its machinery was cumbrous;
about 11% of steel products distribution was eventually controlled by industry plans author-
ized under the Act, and approved by the Secretary of Commerce.
21 Ibid., at § 402(a); 708(a) and (b) of the Defense Production Act, 64 Stat. 798 (1950),
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 2061 (1951), exempting approved plans from the prohibition of the anti-
trust laws is taken from the Voluntary Allocation Act of 1947.
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tained a final decree requiring dissolution of the industry.2 But at that
time the United States Government had built a great number of alumi-
num plants, a majority of which were being operated by the Aluminum
Company of America. Agreement was finally reached on the erection of
the aluminum industry into a concentrate composed of Alcoa, Reynolds
Metal Company and Kaiser Aluminum Company, all of more or less com-
parable size, and fitted out with war plants.28 More recently a fourth mem-
ber of the concentrate has appeared: Anaconda Copper Company has
been assisted to enter the aluminum business.
At the moment, of course, all aluminum is severely controlled in the
emergency interest of national defense. Absent this emergency, it is quite
conceivable that for some period of time the national supply of aluminum
concentrated in three (or perhaps four) great companies will suffice, and
that an "acceptable" price will be maintained, occasioning no further im-
pact. Clearly, should the supply of aluminum prove insufficient there will
be further intervention by the government.
5. Electric Light and Power. In addition to the normal, or at any rate
historical, exercise of power of regulation over electric light and power,
separate and distinct problems developed out of the great move towards
concentration in the hands of great pyramid holding companies which
characterize the decade of the '20s.24 The salient facts of the controversy
need no reviewing here. Partly as a protection to investors, and partly in
an endeavor to bring the problem into manageable form, the Public Utili-
ty Holding Company Act' was passed, giving to the Securities & Ex-
change Commission the task of simplifying corporate structure, and pro-
viding for the integration of operation on more or less regional lines.
Simultaneously with this was an impact caused by the fact that the
electrical industry in the United States had lagged far behind other in-
dustrialized countries in making electrification available to rural commu-
2 2 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 Fed. 2d 416 (C.A. 2d, 1945). Because four
Supreme Court justices were disqualified, by special act of Congress the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit heard the case, Judge Learned Hand writing the opinion.
23 Report of the War Assets Administration to Congress, Feb. 12, 1947, on "Aluminum
Plants and Facilities." The government disposition of these plants furnished the basis on which
Aluminum Co. of America successfully resisted the contention of the Department of Justice
that the decree in the antitrust case should dissolve the company into a number of independent
units.
24 A long series of local struggles had cumulated to a national issue, largely dramatized by
Senator George W. Norris of Nebraska. A not inconsiderable part of American political his-
tory in the decade 1920-1930 turned on this issue.
25 Public Utility Act of 1935,49 Stat. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79 (1951). For history, eco-
nomic and legal analysis of this whole subject, the reader is referred to Twentieth Century
Fund, Electric Power and Government Policy (1948).
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nities.26 There being no legal power to compel extension of privately owned
facilities (beyond relatively small extensions), 2 the United States inter-
vened directly through the Rural Electrification Authority under" the
authority of the Rural Electrification Act.2 8 The result was an extension
of rural electrification with the result that, where about thirty per cent of
farms were electrified in 1920, nearly ninety per cent were electrified in
1948, the increase being divided more or less evenly between private and
government financed operations. 29
Simultaneously with this, a much larger piece of planning was going
forward to the tune of bitter controversy, but nevertheless to the eco-
nomic advantage of great areas. Again the means was direct government
intervention, through government-constructed and government-owned
production. In the southeast, this was done through the Tennessee Valley
Authority; in the southwest, through the power development attendant
on the Hoover Dam; in the northwest, through the power development of
the Columbia River. The scheduled power development in the east, the
St. Lawrence, was blocked owing to controversy over the Seaway. This
is a pattern emerging slowly owing to determined opposition by the elec-
26 In 1925, only 3.2% of the 6,300,000 farms in the United States were served by electricity.
In 1935, only 10.9% were electrified. In that year, the percentages in some countries were
these:
Denmark ................ 85% electrified farms
G erm any ................ 90% .. ..
France .................. 95% " "
Netherlands ............. 99.9% " c
Jurisdiction to compel extension is exercised commonly by state public utilities commissions.
Frequently the legal power to compel extension is, in terms, broad; but has been severely
limited in practical application. But a Missouri commission found that an extension of seven
hundred feet of trolley line to a schoolhouse was unreasonable. Herchenroeder v. St. Joseph
Co., 16 Mo. Public Service Comm'n Rep. 306 (1927). A California commission forced a
water company to extend its mains two thousand feet to a settlement of one hundred families.
Lukrawka v. Spring Valley Water Co., 169 Cal. 318, 146 Pac. 640 (1915). A review of the cases
indicates power to compel extension of lines and service within relatively narrow limits to areas
where profitable operation can be demonstrated.
27 The Rural Electrification Administration was originally created by the President by
Executive Order 7037, May 11, 1935, under authority of the Emergency Relief Appropriations
Act. Subsequently, in 1936, the Norris-Raybum Act, the present Rural Electrification Act, was
passed, 49 Stat. 1363 (1936), 7 U.S.C.A. § 901 (1945).
28 Ibid. The best review of the large picture is found in Twentieth Century Fund, Electric
Power and Government Policy: A Survey of the Relations between Government and the
Electric Power Industry (1948). See also the "Report of the President's Committee on Water
Power Policy," released by the Government in 1951.
29 This conclusion fairly follows from the report of the Twentieth Century Fund Committee,
op. cit. supra note 25, at 766-67.
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tric power industry but with considerable definiteness. 30 Intervention of
the state in this case is split into an illogical division of functions between
the Securities & Exchange Commission, acting under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, regulatory powers granted to the Federal Power
Authority, and direct jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior over
the northwest and southwest production projects, while a fourth element
is introduced by the separate powers and organizations of the Tennessee
Valley Authority. 31
6. Oil. The oil industry, commonly thought of as a stronghold of un-
regulated enterprise, in point of fact works under a planning system vigor-
ously sought by it and largely organized by a mechanism of its own
choice. Impact began first in the early '20s when a shortage was feared and
the Federal Oil Conservation Board was constituted to assure an adequate
supply. But in 1926 the problem was reversed when new discoveries, com-
mencing with the Seminole Field in Oklahoma, cascaded supplies into the
market, followed by the development of Kettleman Hills in California
(1928), Oklahoma City (1929) and of the greatest oil pool in the world,
East Texas (1930). As a result, the American Petroleum Institute in 1929
set up a plan for voluntary production control and market stabilization;
the Department of Justice condemned this as violative of the Sherman
Act. It then attempted a code of fair practice under Federal Trade Com-
mission procedure (July, 1929) which proved ineffective. A voluntary
committee on petroleum economics in 1930 worked with the Bureau of
Mines and the Department of Interior, endeavoring to estimate petroleum
consumption and equate production to these estimates, by curtailing ac-
knowledged production. This involved state cooperation. In 1931 an
agreement was made between three states-Oklahoma, Kansas and Texas
-but much oil not contemplated in the agreement circulated between
states, the three states found themselves unable to enforce their local poli-
cies, and the problem of "hot oil" became literally a fighting issue. 3 Under
the short-lived NRA, an oil code was approved on August 19, 1933, the
30 The Government program was fought first in the courts on constitutional grounds.
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 21 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Tenn., 1938), aff'd, 306 U.S. 118
(1939). The propaganda and political campaign is going on even now. For the earlier stages
of it, see Ransmeier, Shadow and Substance in the TVA Controversy 6, Vanderbilt Univ.,
Papers of the Inst. of Research and Training in the Soc. Sc. (1941); Lief, Democracy's Norris
(1939); Lilienthal, TVA, Democracy on the March (1944) ;Collins, Uncle Sam's Billion Dollar
Baby (1945); Green, An Analysis of the Real Cost of TVA Power (1948).
31 Hodge, The Tennessee Valley Authority, A National Experiment in Regionalism (1938).
n For the spectacular and turgid history, see Hayden, Federal Regulation of the Produc-
tion of Oil (1929); Watkins, Oil: Stabilization or Conservation? (1937); Frey and Ide, A
History of the Petroleum Administration for War (1946). For the local warfare and resulting
martial law, see Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
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Secretary of Interior becoming the Oil Administrator, and a Federal
Tender Board was set up to try to chart the flow of illegal or "hot" oil.
This was submerged in 1935 when the NRA was held unconstitutional.3
However, on February 22, 1935, Congress enacted the Connally "hot
oil" Act as emergency legislation,34 re-establishing the Federal Tender
Board, and it is today substantially the enforcing agency, administered by
the Oil and Gas Division of the Department of Interior. But the major
planning operation was really set up in 1935 by an interstate oil treaty
or compact executed by the Governors of the mid-continent oil producing
states, and consented to by the Congress on August 27, 1935. 35 This com-
pact has been continued to the present with biennial approval by the
Congress, the twenty-one oil producing states being presently parties to it.
The substance of the agreement calls for the producing states to "coor-
dinate" their policies through an interstate Oil Compact Commission, so
that production shall be substantially equated to estimates of consump-
tion made annually by the Bureau of Mines of the Department of Interior.
We can perhaps exclude, as merely temporary, the World War II mecha-
nisms for planning, carried on through the Petroleum Administration for
War in conjunction with an industry committee, the Petroleum Industry
War Council. As a practical matter, the Oil and Gas Division of the De-
partment of Interior, created by an Executive Order in 1946,36 operates in
conjunction with the National Petroleum Council to estimate probable
consumption, and the Interstate Commission regulates production. The
heart of the job is thus an arrangement by which an estimate of production
is made by a federal agency acting in conjunction with an industry com-
mittee, and an interstate oil compact causes the states so to handle their
local regulation that production shall more or less equate to those esti-
mates. A federal law, the Connally Act, 37 makes possible its enforcement.
33 Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
34 49 Stat. 30 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 715 (1948). This is now part of the permanent Federal
Code.
35 H.J.R. 407, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. (1935), approving the compact under the provision of
U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 10. For the scheme itself, see Statement of A. G. White, Chief Economist,
Petroleum Economics Division, Bureau of Mines, Dept. of Interior, American Petroleum Insti-
tute, Petroleum Industry Hearings before the TNEC 547-550 (1942). For a criticism, see Ros-
tow, A National Policy for the Oil Industry (1948). The petroleum industry generally appears
to support the plan.
Obviously, specialized production problems (handling of offset wells, prevention of waste-
ful use of oil fields, and other conservation needs) enter the picture. Yet the dominant impact
was a flow to market of suddenly discovered oil, resulting in a price for crude oil claimed to
be below cost of production.
36 Exec. Order No. 7932, amending Order No. 7756, 11 Fed. Reg. 5985 (1946).
37 49 Stat. 30 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 715 (1948).
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Yet the scheme would be probably impossible were it not for the fact there
is considerable degree of concentration in refining so that, at bottom, the
refineries really enforce a legal system of planning in whose devising they
themselves played a major part.
This is strictly a planning operation. It approximates the outline of the
production and consumption budgets which form part of the basic plan-
ning of the Labor Government which has just relinquished office in Great
Britain.
7. Sugar. Reference need only be made to the Sugar Act of 194838 re-
cently reenacted for a further period of four years. The salient portions of
the plan appeared first in Section 608(a) of Title 7 of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act39 which in turn was superseded by the Sugar Act of 1937.40
The concentrate in question is, of course, the small group of sugar re-
fineries headed by the American Sugar Refining Company; these, how-
ever, have to work with a much larger group of smaller refineries, chiefly
beet sugar producers in the Middle West. Here at the request of the in-
dustry and under a plan substantially conceived by them, the Department
of Agriculture in each year estimates the amount of raw sugar which the
country will presumably need, and fixes the quotas for imports from sugar
producing countries outside the United States which will supply all the
estimated raw material needed. Quotas thus fixed may be increased or de-
creased in the event that circumstances require it, but the intended effect
is to stabilize the price of sugar by equating supply (controlled through the
control of imports of raw sugar) to estimated demand.
This particular piece of industry-government planning is interesting
because, again, it originated in demand for it by the industry rather than
by the community. In point of fact, the plan has contributed to the finan-
38 61 Stat. 922 (1947), 7 U.S.C.A. § 1100 (Supp., 1951). The sugar industry has benefited-
or suffered-less from laissez faire than most industries. British planning and control measures
affected American Colonial history as, for instance, in the case of the Sugar Act of 1733. The
late Charles W. Taussig, Esq., of New York, ran across a manuscript report of a committee
of North American sugar producers and merchants who had repaired to London to lobby for
inclusion of provisions advantageous to them. Aside from tariff control, with a differential
granted to Cuba to assist her in achieving independent national status after the Spanish-
American War, relatively little direct intervention occurred in this country until 1933. In the
period of depressed prices in 1920-1933, a private plan was evolved by the late Thomas Chad-
bourne, Esq., of New York, the gist of which was that Cuba would reduce its sugar production
and exports under stated conditions of production and price, the hope being that the United
States' price of raw sugar would thus be stabilized. Though the Cuban government enacted
the plan, it failed owing to increase of production elsewhere. Since adoption of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), 7 U.S.C.A. § 601 (1939), some sort of controlled
system in the United States has been in virtually continuous operation.
3' 48 Stat. 31 (1933), 7 U.S.C.A. § 608(a) (1939).
40 50 Stat. 903 (1937), 7 U.S.C.A. § 1100 (1939).
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cial stability of the sugar refineries and also of the beet sugar producers and
the relatively small Louisiana and Florida cane sugar producers. On the
other hand, it has kept the price of a staple commodity to the American
consumer higher than it might otherwise have been.
8. The Radio Industry. The impact here arose from the inescapable
physical fact that more than one radio transmission station cannot occu-
py the same wave length.4 Mere requirement of order in the air waves
forced the government, in the person of Mr. Herbert Hoover (then Sec-
retary of Commerce) to attempt regulation and planning; and when the
courts decided he had not power to do this in 1927,42 legislation was ob-
tained from the Congress. The scheme of the Federal Radio Act of 192711
was amplified, in the light of further experience and considerable discus-
sion, between the government authorities and the radio industry, by the
Federal Communications Act of 193444 constituting the Federal Commu-
nications Commission with power to license stations and allocate wave
lengths. The result of their allocation has been to constitute four major
national networks-a concentrate; and smaller regional networks, again
local concentrates.45 Locally, of course, there can be a very considerable
degree of free competition. But the sequelae of the plan have been un-
limited-and the end is clearly not yet.
9. Electronics. The large and growing electronics industry has not yet
reached as defined a pattern as some of these we have noted. Yet, prac-
41 In 1912, to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of London, the Congress of the United
States passed an Act requiring all radio stations to require a license for the operation of a
radio transmitter. 37 Stat. 302 (1912), 47 U.S.C.A. § 51 (1927).
4 By this time, the concentrate was complete. Under agreement of 1920, American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Company, Westinghouse, General Electric, the then owners of Radio
Corporation of America, had arranged matters under their patent rights. General Electric and
Westinghouse were to make radio receiving sets. Radio Corporation of America did the selling.
American Telephone & Telegraph had the exclusive right to make transmitters. American
Telephone & Telegraph Company desired to limit its business to communications and it
dropped out in 1926, in favor of Radio Corporation of America. The radio transmitting sta-
tions accepted the assumed power of the Department of Commerce for a brief period; these
powers were then challenged and held insufficient, Hoover v. Inter-City Radio Co., 286 Fed.
1003 (C.A.D.C., 1923) holding that the powers of the Secretary of Commerce were not dis-
cretionary; but the Secretary's regulations were in general accepted. But in 1926, the Zenith
Radio Corporation simplyignored an order of the Secretary of Commercewho commenced crimi-
nal action under the penal section of the Act of August 13, 1912. The Court held that Secretary
Hoover did not have the power he claimed, United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F. 2d 614
(N.D. Ill., 1926), and the Attorney General of the United States rendered a similar opinion,
35 Atty. Gen. Rep. 126 (1926). President Coolidge then appealed to Congress and the result
was the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927), 47 U.S.C.A. § 81 (1927).
4344 Stat. 1162 (1927), 47 U.S.C.A. § 81 (1927).
4448 Stat. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (Supp., 1951).
* [This footnote has been omitted.-ED.]
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tically, there has been both impact and a degree of ordered result arising
out of the fact that a considerable part of armament work is electronic,
and that the government of the United States is far and away the largest
customer for the more advanced electronic developments. Just as after
World War I, the government of the United States, largely acting through
the Navy Department, caused the creation of the Radio Corporation of
America, so today the handling of government orders is building, in ad-
vance, a concentrate chiefly of four companies-General Electric, Radio
Corporation of America, International Telephone & Telegraph Company
and Westinghouse-with a number of smaller companies like Sylvania
slowly emerging. In this respect, the end is clearly not yet though the
present stage of affairs is not fully disclosed for security reasons.4 6
10. Wire Telegraph. Note need only be made of the wire telegraph in-
dustry. This is now a monopoly, created by Congressional approval given
to the merger of Western Union Telegraph and Postal Telegraph.47
Mention may also be made of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 192148
46 The impact of the electronics industry upon the state is interesting, and perhaps may be
the pattern for impacts in other industries-for instance, chemicals. World War II immensely
widened the use of electronics, for example, in the fields of radar, proximity fuses, marine and
submarine sonic devices and the like, as well as in more intensive developments of radio com-
munication. Later, developments in the field of nuclear fission still further forced research and
application in the electronics field. Research was carried on not only by the government
itself but also by contract in the laboratories of the larger electronics companies. As practical
applications were worked out, "developmental orders" were placed by the government, one
objective being to give the plants of these companies experience in technique in manufacturing
the ensuing devices. This, of course, had a double effect: the means of manufacturing the de-
sired devices were brought into being, but also the companies themselves were made fully
familiar with the latest developments in research available to the government even though
they ranged beyond the discoveries in their own laboratories. The Atomic Energy Commission
has announced that certain of these companies, including General Electric Company, have been
given experimental contracts, for example, to turn atomic power into practical use. The larger
companies thus become virtually partners of the government in developmental operations, and
have, in consequence, an inevitable senior position in civilian and commercial development.
But in the developmental stage the requirements of military secrecy as well as great technical
efficiency necessarily limit the number of companies thus endowed with almost incomparable
"know-how."
This, of course, has not prevented a series of skirmishes or even pitched battles between the
government and the industry in other respects. A recent antitrust decree, United States v.
General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.C.N.J., 1949), decided that General Electric Com-
pany, Westinghouse Electric Company, and others, had conspired to monopolize the in-
candescent electric lamp business, and at present proceedings suggest the possibility of a
decree requiring General Electric to divest itself of part at least of its incandescent lamp busi-
ness. Yet in dealing with this the court took note of the fact that the General Electric Company
had accomplished outstanding mechanical and technological advances, making possible pro-
gressive price reduction policy.
4 Communications Act of 1934, at § 222, 57 Stat. 5 (1943), as amended, 61 Stat. 501 (1947),
47 U.S.C.A. § 222 (Supp., 1951).
48 42 Stat. 159 (1921), 7 U.S.C.A. § 181 (1939).
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which, however, must be taken in conjunction with the decree obtained as
a result of a Sherman Act proceeding against the principal meat packers
in 1920. Not infrequently consent decrees embody a scheme to provide, ad
hoc, judicially, legislation serving as a basis of the plan. In one interesting
case an antitrust decree furnished the sole base-for example, the handling
of the gunpowder industry as a result of a decree obtained in United States
v. E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co. 49
The list could be multiplied at tedious length-and this without touch-
ing on the agricultural fields of staple grains, cotton, and the like, which
are outside the industrial field and in general do not rest on the basis of
corporate concentration of function. A word is in order relative to the in-
dustries, equally concentrated, which have not had serious impact and,
therefore, have not been drawn into some industry-government planning
operation.
Notable among these is the telephone industry. This is substantially a
monopolized industry. But the planning of this giant corporation has so
nearly kept step with the requirements of the community that there has
been no major complaint. The service has been undeniably the best in the
world. The rates have been on the whole acceptable. The extension of
service has been rapid enough so that-save as an aftermath of war-
telephone service has been substantially available to anyone who desired
it. The corporation has severely refrained from using any of the by-prod-
uct powers which can flow from power over communications."0 The com-
49 188 Fed. 127 (C.C. Del., 1911). The "Powder Trust Case" and decree thereunder was
one of the early pattern cases in concentrates. Having adjudged E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Company guilty of monopolizing the gunpowder trade, the court ruled that it should not only
divest itself of part of this business but should set up, equip, staff, and finance the entry into
the business of two other corporations (Atlas Powder Company and Hercules Powder Com-
pany), thus creating a concentrate of three in place of a monopoly of one. This has been,
virtually, the pattern of the industry ever since. It is interesting to note that nearly forty
years later an exactly similar solution was worked out in the aluminum industry, though in
that case the government brought the two competitors, Reynolds Metals Company and Per-
manent Metals Company (later Kaiser Aluminum Company) into existence by sale to them
of war plants.
50 Of interest in this connection is the decision by the American Telephone & Telegraph
Company, in or about 1924, to drop out of the radio broadcasting field though they had been
one of four companies associated in developing this industry. The essential decision was that
transmission of communications was a business in itself; entertainment, education, advertising
and so forth, was a quite different business. Again, though Bell Telephone laboratories had
pioneered much of the work in television, American Telephone & Telegraph Company took no
part in exploiting the resulting industry, presumably for the same reason. A single instance of
serious impact, when the community felt its requirements were not being met, arose from the
shortage of telephones and telephone equipment immediately following World War II. The
community accepted the company's statement attributing shortage to production restrictions
in wartime, and so, rightly, were convinced that the company was doing everything possible
to meet the requirements. This was a sharp contrast to the attitude taken both by and towards
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munity, and indeed the state, have relied on the American Telephone &
Telegraph Company and its component parts to satisfy the need; and
community expectations have been met.
To a less extent somewhat the same thing is true of the automobile in-
dustry-again an industry dominated by concentration though with a
high degree of competition within the corporate frame. This competition,
and vigorous management, has in the main satisfied the community de-
mands. There have been occasional preliminary skirmishes, leading to an
industry policy of freely exchangeable patents; there have been moments
(this was notable through 1947-1949) when the price policies of the com-
panies and the practices of the dealer-marketing arrangements led to
widespread complaint. But the impact was not severe and was safely navi-
gated, at least for the time.
On all the evidence, of which the foregoing is a sample, it is submitted
that the pattern of relations of the corporate concentrate with the govern-
ment is the formation of arrangements which involve a greater or less de-
gree of planning. This is no longer a dim possibility. It is an accomplished
fact, a road regularly traveled, a process not generally known publicly but
generally accepted.5'
Indeed, in all these cases, if the government did not intervene a high de-
gree of industry national planning would be occasioned by the mere fact of
the concentrate itself. In that case, the planners would be officers of cor-
porations, enjoying no public or political status. But planning there would
be. It could hardly be otherwise. Even in the case of highly competitive
industries-for example, the motor car industry-the margin within which
competition is possible is relatively small. The area in which large com-
panies are necessarily controlled by underlying conditions, as for instance,
the cost of labor, the cost of materials, the break-even points of large fac-
tories, and so on, means that the bulk of their policies by sheer necessity
coincide. Small, individual producers cannot easily invade the field. In
any case, there is a large common denominator of habit and point of view
among men who though they nominally, and perhaps actually, compete,
nevertheless live in the same or similar backgrounds, deal with the same
problems, are judged by the estimate of their colleagues in the industry,
the steel industry where the record disclosed that the steel industry had underestimated the
post-war demand in the first place, believed it temporary in the second place, and was believed
to have been motivated in part by fear of expanding production.
5, In the antitrust sector, this is beginning to be recognized. See a very thoughtful article
by Carlston, Antitrust Policy: A Problem in Statescraft, 60 Yale L.J. 1023, especially at 1083
(1951), suggesting that the antitrust laws are really relied on to define and require conformity
to norms of conduct for business institutions.
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and thus tend to conform to common patterns of thought and behavior.
In the strictly monopolized industries, of course, there is, almost by hy-
pothesis, planning.
IV
Examination of these industrial fact situations and of the resulting rela-
tive stabilization of their relations with the community indicates the ex-
istence of community requirements capable of enforcing their satisfaction.
This may be called the "inchoate law" of the system of industrial concen-
trates, up to the point where it has become explicit, as it often has.
As far as can be stated, the requirements thus imposed are as follows:
First: The industry must supply an amount of goods and services for
which it has made itself responsible sufficient to meet reasonably antici-
pated demand.
Second: The price must be "acceptable." This does not mean "fair" or
even "equitable." It means, quite simply, a price which does not incite the
anger or opposition of the community, or create a feeling that the com-
munity is being victimized. An "acceptable" price is not to be confused
with the "reasonable" price concept in Public Utility law.
In addition to this, two further requirements appear slowly to be
materializing though they perhaps represent the community requirements
of tomorrow rather than of today. They are:
Third: Requirement that the industry shall be so operated as to give
some stability of employment;
Fourth: Requirement that the industry shall not be discontinued or re-
located in a manner which will occasion a great measure of hardship or
distress to the community in which it operates.
V
We have thus far examined only the results of requirements imposed for
the assumed benefit of the community as a whole. It is necessary to follow
now the emerging requirement of a degree of minimal protection for indi-
viduals dealing within the system of a concentrate.
By far the most developed branch of this subject deals with relations
of employers with labor. It comes under the separate and quite systema-
tized head of "Labor Law." It is not dealt with here-not because it is not
relevant but because it is already a specialized, well recognized, and very
highly developed system of law. The other, less systematized, branch of
the same subject is the protection offered individuals other than em-
ployees who deal with concentrated economic power.
The basic emerging concept appears to be a restatement, in economic
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terms, of the constitutional requirement that every man is entitled to
"equal protection of the laws," and that no arm of the state shall deny
him life, liberty or property without due process of law.
It is here submitted that a corporation or concentrate of corporations,
so situated that it has power seriously to affect the individual life of a
patron or customer, has become an arm of the state so that its actions are
reviewable to determine whether or not they accord with the constitu-
tional limitations and requirements imposed on states. Two applications
of this rule have already been made, namely, (1) that a corporation in a
position of such power may not unreasonably discriminate as between one
customer and another; and (2) it may not exercise its economic power so
as to deny or hinder the exercise by any person of his constitutional right
of freedom of speech and freedom of worship. It seems probable that these
two applications (which have already begun to find judicial expression)
are merely the beginning of rather wider and more detailed application as
economic power may increasingly be exercised by nominally private en-
terprises.
Again, the argument can only be summarized in this paper.
Within the historic field of public utilities, discrimination on account of
race was matter of frequent controversy in the courts; discrimination was
forbidden by Section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act.5 2 The second is
both personal and economic-economic distribution through rebates or
other discriminatory service, favoring or penalizing one as against an-
other, was outlawed as a practice of carriers under the Act.
This might be dismissed as merely carrying forward an historic public
utility pattern. But the same could not be held true of the reasoning of the
courts in Mitchell v. United States.53 There, the dictum of the Court was
that while discrimination was certainly a violation of Section 3 of the In-
terstate Commerce Act, yet in any case "the denial to the appellant of
equality of accommodations because of his race would be an invasion of a
fundamental individual right which is guaranteed against state action by
the Fourteenth Amendment." 54 In 1948, the Supreme Court in Shelley v.
Kraemer,5 set up a line of reasoning bound to enter the field we have been
discussing. In that case, racial restrictive covenants made by and between
private land owners were held unenforcible by the state courts since in en-
forcing them, the state courts would be committing a violation of rights
created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, and guaran-
52 24 Stat. 380 (1887), 49 U.S.C.A. § 30 (Supp., 1951). 54 Ibid., at 94.
53 313 U.S. 80 (1941). 55 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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teed to the individual. "The rights established are personal rights," ob-
served the Court. It was true, the Court observed that private conduct
alone, however discriminatory or wrongful, does not violate rights guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment. "6 But where the action violative of
such rights is taken by authority derived from the state, the Amendment
comes into play. There remains only the question whether violation by a
corporation has this color of state action.
Obviously, a corporation exists by virtue of a charter; it comes into ex-
istence and derives authority to act as a collectivity by reason of state
authority. In some sense, indeed, it exists by reason of the state interest
in carrying forward commerce and industry. The economist would add
that the power it derives from its size is an essential element of, if not a
direct and foreseeable result of, such state action. In at least one leading
case, Marsh v. Alabama,5" the Supreme Court approached the subject.
There a corporation owned a company town; as owner, it prosecuted for
trespass the distributors of religious tracts on the streets of the town; the
Supreme Court held that when private property had reached the point of
being engaged in a public function, the exercise of property rights could
not interfere with the Constitutional right of freedom of speech and of re-
ligion. Taking the two lines of argument-that flowing from Shelley v.
Kraemer and that flowing from Marsh v. Alabama, the conclusion seems
reasonably predictable. If, for instance, a corporation dealing in goods
or services essential to the life of an individual discriminates against a cus-
tomer on the ground of race or in a matter which invades his Constitution-
al right of freedom of speech or religion, it would seem that there is a vio-
lation of the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. One remembers
that the old decree of exile in Rome was prohibition of the use of fire and
water within a stated distance of that city. Refusal to serve, or discrimina-
tion in service, by a corporation could, in an extreme case, accomplish that
result. The thrust of the doctrine here propounded is precisely that where
the corporation by reason of size or of degree of concentration has acquired
power giving it the capacity to impede personality or personal life it has
become, tanto qanto, an arm of the state both because it is a state char-
tered corporation and because it is relied on by the community as a neces-
sary part of its economic function.
The doctrine here put forward goes no farther than that. An individual
corporation may perhaps indulge the luxury of private discrimination
,6 Ibid., at 13.
57 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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against a customer in a situation in which fifty other corporations are
quite prepared to meet the customer's demand. In such case, there is no
denial of equal protection of the laws for the simple reason that the corpo-
ration is not in a position to produce that result. But as it accumulates
power, as it is increasingly able appreciably to affect the conditions of life
of its customer, it approaches, and at length, falls under the limitations
imposed on the state itself.
The foundation cases raised the problem of discrimination on the
ground of race or religion. The principle of equal protection of the laws
would seem to apply with equal force to a problem merely economic. If,
for example, one of the principal members of the aluminum concentrate,
for strictly intra-mural reasons, disliked a certain fabricator of aluminum
and by consequence unreasonably discriminated against him, either in
price, terms of service, and so forth, so as to endanger his livelihood, it
would appear that the Constitutional principle would apply. And this
would be true likewise in a case in which the corporation acted as buyer
as well as seller, though here the lines are far less clear, and the law is like-
ly to be longer developing. More probably, in this respect, the law will de-
velop as a by-product of the Antitrust Act. Indeed, the development is
foreshadowed by the present actions against American Telephone & Tele-
graph Company, asking divesture of its interest in Western Electric, and
against the Dupont Company, asking it to dispose of its holdings in Gen-
eral Motors.17 The express reason urged is that this tends to require pur-
chase by the connected companies of their respective products, and denies
others a fair chance at the market. Certain of the provisions of the Robin-
son-Patman Act tending to prevent discrimination in terms of sale fall
perhaps into the same category. As in the race discrimination cases, the
first line of attack is through the field of trade regulation. But the ultimate
principle seems Constitutional in nature.
If, instead of electing to carry on its economics through the form of the
concentrate, the United States had adopted the practice of carrying on the
samefunctionsthrough asocialized governmental bureau, the FifthAmend-
ment (or in the case of the state, the Fourteenth Amendment) would dearly
apply. As the form of the concentrate, and peculiarly the state regulated
and state planned concentrate, becomes increasingly the mode, there
would seem to be no escape from similar treatment. We have come a long
ra The complaints are found in the CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 61,219, United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., Civil Action 49, c. 1071 (1949), and 61,186, United States v.
Western Electric Co. and American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (1949).
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way from the dictum of justice Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases5 8 that a
private wrong cannot offend the Constitution. We have traveled that dis-
tance because, quite simply, the large corporation, especially in a concen-
trate which dominates an industry, is not "private" in any individual
sense.
VI
The emergence of the concept of protection of individuals, be they sup-
pliers or customers, along with the emerging system of rights of labor and
workmen, means in substance a system of protection for the individuals
constituting all of the groups with which a great corporation comes into
contact. And here perhaps is the deep cleft between the systems now com-
peting for dominance in the modem, industrialized world. The legal struc-
ture in our system subjects the dominant economic organization and the
holder of the power created by itto limitations for the purpose of protect-
ing individuals in their essential freedom. It subjects them to a measure
of planning for the protection of the community as a whole in the measure
and to the extent that the community considers protection to be neces-
sary. In this respect, we are merely doing to great corporations what the
Norman law, later Magna Carta, did to the Crown and the great nobles
in the feudal period. Even in the case of a modem corporation there is
coming to be the right to cry, "Haro," and assure a hearing where per-
sonal liberty has been unreasonably invaded.
We may close by glancing down a very long vista.
History appears to exhibit a cycle in which social organization is some-
times dominated by organization and ascendant power, and at other
times by highly individualized life with a high degree of individualized
possessory property. The core of the feudal system rested not on property
but on power. This was gradually dispersed: the collectivized power of the
feudal dukes dissipated into the individual titles of tiny landholders in the
nineteenth century. The industrial era appears to have compelled a large
measure of recollectivization of property. It has used the socialist bureau
or the modern corporation as its two principal methods. In great areas,
we have moved away from the individual and possessory property stage
into a stage of great organization. But organization, economic as well as
political, turns on power, not on title. Protection of individual liberty
might possibly be carried out by impeding or preventing recollectivization
of economic function with its attendant increase of power in private or
public hands or in both working together. Nowhere, so far as this writer
58 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883).
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is aware, has such a policy been successfully pursued in recent years. Ap-
parently the community has wanted or needed the results of large organi-
zation more than it feared the existence of such organization. It follows
that the protection of the essential freedoms instinctive in Anglo-Ameri-
can law and in the American democracy involves the development of at
least two bodies of law, both of which are appearing. The first is a require-
ment that the collectivized organisms essential to the economic life of the
modem state shall be so handled that they can and do acceptably perform
their functions of supply and growth. The second is that within them, and
as an offset to their necessary organization and power, the basic rights of
individuals shall be as scrupulously protected against them as they were
against the erstwhile political state. Thus we are merely retracing in this
field a legal history analogous to that of the taming of feudal institutions
since Magna Carta, seven centuries ago.
